Are they dividing the world between them? "Putin and Xi sit back and watch the hectic pace of Europe"
Has Trump ushered in the age of authoritarian superpowers and brought back the law of the jungle in global trade? A foreign policy advisor explains to blue News the consequences of "America First".
No time? blue News summarizes for you
- Trump's announcements and negotiation offers suggest that a new era of authoritarian superpowers is dawning.
- In terms of trade policy, he is also relying on the law of the jungle, at least verbally, and is trying to assert his interests regardless of existing rules and agreements.
- Foreign policy advisor Remo Reginold explains to blue News how many of Trump's announcements are actually likely to be followed by action and what options Europe and Switzerland have to maintain their position in the world.
Buying Greenland, taking over the Gaza Strip and the Panama Canal, negotiating peace in Ukraine without Kiev and , last but not least, canceling the decades-old security guarantees for Europe. Trump and his government colleagues responsible for foreign policy have made it clear that they think little of the multipolar world order based on universally applicable rules.
Instead, the Trump administration relies on hard power, on asserting its own interests with the force of its own economic and military strength. "America First" is the battle cry that the president is now trying to put into practice.
Will America First bring a new world order?
These are still just announcements. If the USA follows through with action, multilateral organizations such as NATO and the UN will lose a great deal of importance. NATO in particular, founded in 1949, is still the central element of European and US security policy today. Because Europe provides NATO with proportionately fewer resources and therefore benefits one-sidedly from the USA, President Trump is calling the mutual assistance article into question. Europe can no longer rely on NATO, led by the USA, to rush to its aid if it is attacked militarily.
Foreign policy advisor Remo Reginold explains to blue News whether the multipolar world is indeed history and what the Trump administration's behavior means for the rest of the world.
Remo Reginold is a political scientist and lecturer at the University of Basel. He advises governments and companies on foreign and security policy issues.
The Trump administration has little regard for the multilateralism of the UN and NATO. What principles do you recognize in the geopolitics of the US government?
I wonder whether Trump has any clear principles at all. He is trying to sell himself as a strong man. I have big question marks over whether he is one. I recognize the "fire and forget" principle in Trump's approach - just fire someone and then see what happens. And when those affected have found their answer, he's already on to the next topic. His decrees are an example of this. He writes decrees like other people write shopping lists. Whether they are implemented, whether they can be implemented at all, is then of secondary importance.
Even if Trump, as an authoritarian leader, is above all a staged performance - could he not nevertheless be encouraging Putin and Xi to pursue their goals without regard for international law?
What Trump has done so far in his second term of office is "popular politics". For his voters, he plays the strong man who gets things done. But real politics is much more complicated. The world is so interconnected, especially economically and technologically. The USA and other countries are much more interdependent than Trump wants to admit.
He can't just throw that overboard. One example: Trump is currently stylizing a trade war against China. But the Americans and the Chinese are working together in science and technological research. According to Georgetown University's Emerging Technology Observatory, for example, the USA and China have co-authored more than 46,000 research publications on artificial intelligence in the last ten years.
Trump's announcements of a radical change of course in US foreign policy are already prompting other countries to take action. Is he already creating facts?
Trump is shooting from the hip. The Greenland initiative is an example of this. But he can also hit something from the hip. And let's be aware: Arctic policy has long been an issue between the major powers. A Chinese investor has already wanted to buy part of Iceland. Among other things, this is a threat to which the Trump government is responding with its statements on Greenland. The difference to the past is that Trump is making undiplomatic statements and taking a stand.
Are the strong men now dividing the world among themselves?
President Trump presents himself as a strong leader who takes action and asserts himself. He wants to negotiate peace in Ukraine with Putin alone. Some observers already see Donald Trump dividing up the world with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, while others expect a foursome in which India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who rules with a heavy hand, is also awarded a share of the world.
The vast majority of states that are not superpowers are left out. The European democracies in particular see their influence waning and new security risks emerging when three or four strong men dominate the world order.
Reginold does not believe in a redivision of the world in the manner of the Cold War. The situation is much more complex. China in particular has been strengthening its position of power for years and at various levels.
What do you think of the view that President Trump only wants to negotiate with Xi Jinping, Putin and possibly Modi and that the rest of the world has to bend to the will of the great leaders?
In any case, Trump sees himself in the same league as Putin and Xi, although neither Putin nor Xi are riding on his wavelength. He likes their authoritarian style of leadership. And he also likes to be perceived as an authoritarian power figure. He would like to divide the world between these leaders. He doesn't care whether this is even possible, whether it fits in terms of content. Incidentally, he did not invent the process of claiming land. He copied Putin with his invasion of Ukraine. In his speech to Congress, Trump repeatedly hinted that the USA would take Greenland and the Panama Canal. This is a subtle hint.
What reactions do you expect from Putin and Xi Jinping when Trump so blatantly legitimizes realpolitik?
Putin is sitting back and watching the Europeans engage in activism and blitz diplomacy. And the Chinese government can sit back even further. They have created so many economic dependencies that they already have us under control anyway. They are keeping the realpolitik card up their sleeve.
Chinese warships are appearing in places where they have never been seen before. That's already realpolitik - isn't it?
Much more impressive was how quickly China built up its navy and how the world was able to follow in real time via satellite images how one warship after another was completed. These are strong signs and new forms of power politics. If the US wants to build an aircraft carrier, it has to invest ten years in building shipyards before it can start. China has also shown how toothless international law is: for example, the International Court of Arbitration has declared the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea illegal, but nothing has happened.
What does this mean for international law, for the sovereignty of the majority of states that are not major powers?
This should not be underestimated. International politics is already creating facts. In the West, and especially in Europe, we still rely heavily on international law and multilateralism. This has proved its worth over the last 50 years, and the West has been able to position itself successfully with it. But that is no longer the case. Today's geopolitical situation is what is known by the acronym VUCA: volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. We have to learn to deal with it.
Does the law of the jungle now also apply in the global economy?
Trump came into office promising to make the USA great again and US citizens more prosperous. Where he considers current economic relations to be detrimental to the US, he is threatening to impose tariffs, making exports from those countries to the US more expensive. Those affected by the tariffs can either impose tariffs themselves, which is to the detriment of all, or they can do what the US government wants them to do.
The fact that the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibit such steps in many cases does not stop Trump from announcing tariffs and thus putting pressure on other governments. The law of the jungle is also spreading in global trade. President Trump acknowledges that higher tariffs also affect the US economy and make products in the US more expensive. However, he is convinced that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, while the pro-business think tank Tax Foundation, for example, estimates additional costs of over 1,000 dollars per household. According to forecasts, the tariffs threatened by Canada, Mexico and China, as well as those on steel, aluminum and cars, will reduce US GDP by 0.55% - not including retaliatory measures by the affected countries.
In a trade war, there will be losers on all sides. What is certain is that tough announcements about well-established economic relationships and supply chains are currently dominating. However, Reginold sees the tariff announcements primarily as a threatening gesture.
The Trump administration is also relying on hard power when it comes to economic policy. Can the market itself and the financial markets in particular act as a corrective here, or are we also heading towards an era of economic realpolitik?
Trump is relying on tariffs, but is also quickly withdrawing them. If they really do become permanent and the other countries react with reciprocal tariffs, then everyone will pay for it with inflation and a fall in GDP. That hurts everyone, including the people in the USA. If it comes to that, it is possible that the Trump administration will take a different direction.
But the international markets will probably send out signals before then. I don't put too much stock in Trump's tariff policy just yet. This is rhetoric to show that he is implementing his campaign promises.
What will happen to Europe now?
There has been no shortage of warnings about what a second Trump term would mean for European security policy. Nevertheless, the EU and its member states have only begun to adapt to the new world situation in the first few weeks of the new administration.
Previous US administrations, including Joe Biden's, have already called for European states to become more involved in NATO and invest more in their own military security. However, Trump's demonstrative keeping Europe on the sidelines in the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine has shown the states of the old continent that things are now serious and that they can no longer rely on the USA.
Reginold observes that the EU and its governments are currently focusing heavily on military security. Yet it has other opportunities to consolidate its position in the world.
What does this possible new world order mean for the EU?
Painted in black and white, Europe is currently in a bad position. Diplomacy has become hectic, there is one summit meeting after another and Macron wants to quickly take over nuclear deterrence for Europe. It remains to be seen whether this is such a clever move. The EU currently only sees military security. The EU states have forgotten how to create and use dependencies. Supply chains can be used to make countries dependent and thus increase their own security. China was much cleverer at this than anyone else. Through science, technology and supply chains, China has created dependencies that we are not even aware of.
Can the EU still work its way out of the defensive?
Yes, Europe has gambled it away in the past, but let's not forget that it is an economic power that cannot be ignored. In addition, the diversity of the states is a strength that they can play cleverly, so European right-wing national governments can act differently and at best build a bridge to Trump, while France can cleverly position itself as a diplomatic tactician, the Scandinavian north and the Baltic states as the frontline against Russia and Germany as the unifier of Europe. With this diversity, we can enter into negotiations with the USA, China, the Middle East or India depending on the situation.
We do not simply have the Cold War 2.0. The fixed alliances and blocs are being replaced by frenemies, i.e. states and groups that can be friends in one situation and enemies in another. India, for example, works together with both the EU and Russia. The EU must also move in this direction. Last week, Ursula von der Leyen and practically the entire European Commission visited Indian Prime Minister Modi - rather late, in my opinion, but a start.
Can the EU do it?
The wake-up call has been received. If the bureaucracy manages to keep up with the pace that diplomacy is currently setting, then something can happen. However, the war rhetoric is also dangerous because it gives Russia even more reason to arm itself. Several intelligence agencies believe it is possible that Russia will be in a position to attack another European country between 2027 and 2029.
Do you mean that Europe is increasing the risk of being attacked by Russia because it is preparing to be able to stand up to Russia militarily?
That is difficult to judge. I think it would be cleverer if we could create other elements of dependency in addition to military deterrence; technology, supply chains, raw materials, but also projections of interpretation, where symbolic strength is projected, play an important role.
What does all this mean for Switzerland?
Even as a non-member, Switzerland has benefited from NATO's military protection. By guaranteeing Europe's security, Nato also protects Switzerland, which is surrounded by Nato member states. If the USA ceases to be the backbone of Nato's operational readiness, Switzerland will also be less secure.
In addition, the export-oriented Swiss economy is vulnerable and would suffer from tariffs and other trade barriers imposed by the US government. However, Reginold sees trade policy in particular as an opportunity for Switzerland to increase its security.
How should Switzerland respond to this?
As a small player, we must first look at what the big players are doing. Switzerland is known in international politics for not having a real foreign policy strategy. We are not a state of big shots. But perhaps the best strategy for us is that we don't have one, and that we can adapt depending on the situation. The BRICS countries are doing this successfully.
Can you give us an example?
Free trade agreements and bilateralism will become more important in the future, also for security. Now we have to look at countries and regions where the opportunities are not yet visible. We must try to predict which countries will become important in the future. As a purely theoretical example: perhaps Switzerland will benefit at some point if it strengthens its relations with Bangladesh now. This could also be about supply chains. Bangladesh certainly plays a role in the new Silk Road, and perhaps this will improve Switzerland's position vis-à-vis China. Switzerland's understanding of foreign policy is still too technical. It should become more creative.